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Insider threat is one of the risks both government and private organizations have to deal 
with in protecting their important information. Data exfiltration and data leakage 
resulting from insiders’ activities can be very difficult to identify and quantify. 
Unfortunately, existing solutions that efficiently check whether data moving across a 
network is known to be sensitive are not resilient to attackers that make changes—even 
trivial modifications—to the data prior to exfiltration.  
This capstone examines the potential use of the sdhash approximate matching 
algorithm within the data exfiltration domain. Sdhash can be employed to look for active 
transfer of known sensitive files in network traffic, but in practice is hindered by the 
computational time required to check for known sensitive data. This research tested the 
performance of both the GPU and CPU implementation of sdhash to determine their 
suitability in high-network traffic environments such as the Department of Defense. 
The results of this experiment showed that better performance is achieved with 
the GPU when comparing large data sets. For small data sets, the CPU and GPU 
implementations exhibited similar performance. Thus, sdhash in the GPU 
implementation would be suitable for the Defense Department’s use. 
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The threat posed by insiders to governments, institutions and organizations 
continues to grow, yet not enough protections exist to combat this threat. A greater 
fraction of IT budgets goes toward providing perimeter defenses [1], while less is spent 
on new technologies that will provide better protection for an organization’s important 
data. Despite rigorous background checks and lie-detector examinations (polygraphs) by 
governments and organizations, we are still seeing an increase in the number of IT 
administrators constantly abusing their privileged access by viewing or stealing sensitive 
data. Sensitive data include but are not limited to customer data, weapon design, 
intellectual property (IP), credit card information, and trade secrets. Data exfiltration and 
leakage can force a business to fold, and other consequences may include loss of money, 
loss of competitive advantage, loss of trust in government, and endangerment to national 
security.  
The two types of insiders that pose a threat to an organization’s sensitive data are 
inadvertent insiders and malicious insiders. An inadvertent insider is a trusted person 
with access to sensitive information who unintentionally discloses it. A malicious insider 
is defined as a current or former employee, contractor, or business partner who has or had 
authorized access to an organization’s network, system, or data and intentionally 
exceeded or misused that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability of the organization’s information and information systems [2]. 
There are a variety of reasons why a malicious insider will want to leak or steal sensitive 
information. These reasons include excessive debt, retaliation against the organization, 
family problems like divorce or marital conflict, inadequate safeguards and improper 
classification of sensitive data, inadequate organization policy, etc.   
Even though many surveys suggest that the number of insider attacks is smaller 
than the number of outsider attacks [3], [4], the damage resulting from an insider’s attack 
can be more dangerous, more devastating and more challenging to detect and prevent 
given the fact that insiders have legitimate access to an organization’s network and 
information. A prominent example is that of National Security Agency (NSA) contractor 
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employee Edward Snowden, who leaked details of a purported NSA program known as 
Prism—a classified program that allows the government to tap into the central servers of 
nine leading U.S. Internet companies and collect metadata (data about data) [5]. Another 
example of a recent insider attack is that of Morgan Stanley, the sixth-largest financial 
service company in the United States. One of its employees stole and posted account data 
for hundreds of thousands of its wealth management clients [6]. An additional example of 
insider threat is that of U.S. Army Private First Class Bradley Manning, an intelligence 
analyst with a security clearance, who allegedly downloaded classified files from military 
networks and leaked them to the anti-secrecy website WikiLeaks [7]. Despite the 
staggering number of data breach incidents by insiders being reported in media outlets, 
governments and organizations are still not doing enough to safeguard their important 
information. According to Park, enterprises and governments will fail to protect 75 
percent of sensitive data by the year 2020 and by 2015, at least one more Snowden- or 
WikiLeaks-like event is likely to occur [8].  
A. MOTIVATION 
Data exfiltration is the unauthorized transfer of sensitive information from a 
target’s network to a location that a threat actor controls [9]. Advances in technology and 
always-on high-speed Internet connectivity have provided insiders many avenues by 
which they can easily exfiltrate or leak an organization’s sensitive information. Insiders 
can transfer data over the network either by sending it as an attachment in electronic mail 
(email), Instant Messenger (IM), posting it on social media sites such as Facebook, 
Instagram, Twitter, LinkedIn, etc., or transferring it to cloud storage services such as 
Google Drive, Microsoft OneDrive, DropBox, Apple iCloud. In some organizations 
where employees are allowed to bring their own devices (BYOD), malicious insiders can 
also use this outlet to steal an organization’s important data. Given the various avenues 
that can be employed to steal or disclose sensitive data, it becomes a daunting task for 
organizations to know when their important data are being exfiltrated.  
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B. SCENARIO 
Illustrated in Figure 1 is a real live scenario where a malicious insider used email 
to exfiltrate a highly classified sensitive document. This scenario occurred in a military 
unit, which had a keyword matching filtering system in place to detect exfiltration. As 
seen in the figure, the insider used the built-in Search and Replace function on Microsoft 
Word to replace some characters in the sensitive document (i.e., a for @, s for $, e for 3) 
and sent it as an attachment. The keyword matching filtering system failed to alert 
because it could not match exactly the defined keywords. As a result, the insider was able 
to successfully exfiltrate the sensitive document. Thus, a keyword matching filtering 
system as a way for organizations to protect their sensitive data is not good enough 
because of its reliance on exact keyword matching.  
 
 
Figure 1.  Diagram showing insider exfiltrating sensitive file 
With this problem in mind, this study will employ an approximate matching 
algorithm known as sdhash in an effort to detect data exfiltration over the network, while 
measuring sdhash performance on both a Central Processing Unit (CPU)—which is 
responsible for normal processing of computer instructions, normally consisting of a few 
cores optimized for sequential serial processing—and a Graphic Processing Unit 
(GPU)—optimized for parallel processing, normally consisting of thousands of smaller, 
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more efficient cores designed for handling multiple tasks simultaneously, in order to 
determine which one will be suitable in a high network traffic environment such as the 
DOD. 
The main questions this capstone seeks to answer are:  
1. Which implementation of sdhash’s approximate matching algorithm is practical 
in DOD networks (GPU vs CPU implementation)? 
2. Can approximate matching completely stop data exfiltration/leakage? 
C. THESIS OUTLINE 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Chapter II describes existing 
solutions used by the DOD to prevent data exfiltration/leakage, describes previous work, 
provides background on approximate matching algorithms and examines three of the 
prominent ones. Chapter III explains the methodology used in carrying out the 
experiment. Chapter IV describes results of the experiment, while Chapter V concludes, 
presents research for future study, and provides limitations of approximate matching. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXISTING SOLUTIONS TO DATA 
EXFILTRATION 
1. HOST-BASED SECURITY SYSTEM 
A host-based security system (HBSS) is a collection of flexible, commercial off-
the-shelf (COTS) and government off-the-shelf (GOTS) applications designed to detect 
and counter, in real time, known cyber threats to the Department of Defense (DOD) [10]. 
It was conceptualized in 2005 by DOD Enterprise Solutions Steering Group (ESSG) and 
its initial rollout began in 2006. It is deployed on DOD enclaves such as Non-Classified 
Internet Protocol Routed Network (NIPRNET) and Secret Internet Protocol Routed 
Network (SIPRNET). Some of the HBSS application components include anti-virus, anti-
spyware, Rogue System Detection (RSD), Host Intrusion Prevention (HIPS), Asset 
Baseline Monitor (ABM), Policy Auditor (PA), McAfee Agent (MA) and Device Control 
Module (DCM)—a subset of Data Loss Prevention (DLP). The DCM component of 
HBSS is what DOD uses as its solution to data exfiltration and leakage. 
2. DATA LOSS PREVENTION (DLP)/DEVICE CONTROL MODULE 
(DCM) 
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) is an approach used to detect, monitor, and protect 
confidential data at rest, in motion, and on the endpoint through deep content inspection 
and the constant monitoring of transactions occurring on each host or across the network 
[11]. Many security vendors such as McAfee, Symantec, TrendMicro, Sophos, etc., now 
offer DLP either as a standalone solution to data exfiltration/leakage or as part of a 
security suite like HBSS.  
The Device Control Module (DCM), a component of the HBSS suite, is a subset 
of the McAfee product Data Loss Prevention. It is designed to prevent data exfiltration 
and leakage by preventing the unauthorized use of peripheral devices such as thumb 
drives and other removable storage. Its main function is to prevent insiders, whether 
malicious or inadvertent, from copying sensitive information into unauthorized 
removable drives.  
 6
The guide to creating HBSS DCM rules can be downloaded from Defense 
Information System Agency (DISA). The Information Assurance Manager (IAM) is 
responsible for following the guide to create block removable USB device rule and 
deploying the rule to all hosts (servers, workstations, and laptops) connected to the DOD 
network. After the rule has been applied to all hosts, any subsequent USB drives plugged 
into the host will be reported to a central management server known as the ePolicy 
Orchestrator (ePO) through McAfee Agent (MA).  
The IAM is also responsible for the day-to-day upkeep of all HBSS components 
to ensure it is functioning properly. This responsibility includes downloading and 
applying patches from DISA repository, monitoring different events generated by 
different components of HBSS including DCM logged events, ensuring all hosts on the 
network have HBSS agents installed, etc. Figure 2 shows an ePO server web console 
dashboard where an administrator can login to see the status of different HBSS 
components including DCM activities. Information gathered here can be used for further 
investigation into the nature of security incidents.  
  
 
Figure 2.  Example of McAfee ePolicy Orchestrator Management Console, 
from [12], showing Incidents by Policy, Protocols, and Destination IPs  
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Because DCM is implemented as a host-based data prevention solution, it 
presents some holes that could be exploited by malicious insiders. For one, this is only 
preventing exfiltration or leakage of data at endpoints or data at rest; it does not fully 
prevent exfiltration of data in motion, for instance sensitive files sent as an attachment in 
email or uploaded to cloud storage like Google Drive. Since DCM is installed as a service 
and relies on agent to send activities to centralized console, a rogue administrator can 
potentially stop the DCM service and disable the agent on a particular host in order to 
prevent it from reporting its activities. Even if the agent is reporting to the central server, 
the administrator still needs to be constantly monitoring the events in order to weed out 
false positives and false negatives—a practice that can be time and labour intensive. The 
centralized management of events also presents a single point of failure because if this 
server goes down some important events could be missed.  
HBSS DCM is a step in the right direction for protecting the DOD’s sensitive and 
classified information from being leaked or exfiltrated, but it has some weak points that 
can be exploited by a malicious insider who is aware of its presence. For these reasons, 
there is a need for either an all-encompassing data exfiltration detection and prevention 
solution or a solution that can work in conjunction with existing DCM (HIDS) in order to 
fully prevent or reduce exfiltration and leakage. Therefore, approximate matching based 
approaches promise an attractive method that can work in parallel with HBSS DCM in 
preventing exfiltration that occurs over the network. 
B. PREVIOUS WORK 
History has shown that organizations and governments have been dealing with 
insider threat for quite a while and for this reason, different algorithms have been 
employed to protect sensitive data. Some of the prior efforts in data exfiltration 
prevention include pattern matching, keyword matching and cryptographic hashing.  
1. Pattern Matching 
Pattern matching is a technique used in automated data analysis to search for all 
occurrences of strings in a body of text. It is a problem of locating all occurrences of 
string x (the pattern) in another string t of length n (the text) [13]. Its objective is to 
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identify the location of a specific text pattern within a larger body of text. Pattern 
matching is used in applications such as virus signature checking, Network Intrusion 
Detection Systems (NIDS), search-and-replace in word processors, web search engines, 
and spam filters. The two main types of pattern matching are exact pattern matching and 
regular expression pattern matching.  
a. Exact Pattern Matching 
Exact pattern matching searches for occurrences of a single pattern in a body of 
text or binary data. Early NIDS, such as older release of snort [14], are based on exact 
pattern matching. Snort uses algorithms such as Rabin-Karp, Knuth-Morris-Pratt (KMP), 
and Boyer-Moore. 
(1) Rabin-Karp  
Michael O. Rabin and Richard M. Karp developed the Rabin-Karp algorithm in 
1987 [15] with the intention to solve the shortcomings of the brute force algorithm. Their 
approach is to generate a digital signature (hash) of the pattern to find, then generate hash 
of all possible sub-strings of the text, and then compare both all at once [16]. Rabin-
Karp’s complexity is O(nm) where n is the length of the text and m is the length of the 
pattern, but in practice it’s O(n+m). This algorithm saves time and is more efficient than 
brute force. Even though there are many faster algorithms, Rabin-Karp algorithm is very 
useful in detecting plagiarism because it is capable of performing multiple pattern 
matching. 
(2) Knuth-Morris-Pratt (KMP) 
Donald E. Knuth, James H. Morris, and Vaughan R. Pratt developed the Knuth-
Morris-Pratt algorithm in 1977 in order to reduce the redundancy of the Rabin-Karp 
algorithm [17]. Their approach is to skip useless comparisons that happen in Rabin-Karp 
by first creating a partial match table of the pattern and then performing the search. It 
compares the characters in the pattern from left to right, using knowledge of previous 
characters compared. Knuth-Morris-Pratt’s complexity is O(n+m) where n is the length 
of text while m represents length of pattern. This algorithm is faster than Rabin-Karp 
 9
mainly because it does not need to keep going back to the beginning of the text whenever 
there is a mismatch in the comparison, which makes it suitable for processing large files. 
The following table shows the KMP algorithm: 
 
KMP-Matcher(T,P)  
       n = T.length  
       m = P. length  
       p = Compute-Prefix-Function(P)  
       q = 0  
       for i = 1 to n  
               while q > 0 and P[q + 1] <> T[i]  
                         q = p[q]  
                         if P[q + 1] == T[i]  
  q = q + 1  
  if q == m  
           print “Pattern occurs with shift” i - m  
           q = p[q]  
                  return p 
Table 1.   Knuth-Morris-Pratt (KMP) algorithm 
 
(3) Boyer-Moore 
Robert S. Boyer and J Strother Moore developed Boyer-Moore algorithm in 1977 
in order to improve the performance of pattern matching [18]. It is considered the most 
efficient pattern matching algorithm. Like KMP, this algorithm also pre-processes the 
pattern in order to compute a shift table. Unlike other pattern matching algorithms, it 
compares characters in the pattern from right to left and if a mismatch is found, it will 
compute how far the pattern should move to the right before another match is attempted. 





    n = T.length  
   m = P.length  
   l = Compute-Last-Ocurrence-Function(P, m, E)  
   y = Compute-Good-Suffix-Function(P, m)  
   s = 0  
         while s <= n – m  
              do j = m  
         while j > 0 and P[j] = T[s + j]  
             do j = j – 1  
if j = 0  
print “Pattern occurs at shift” s  
s = s + y[0]  
else  
s = s + max(y[j],j - l[T[s+j]])  n mO 
Table 2.   Boyer-Moore algorithm 
 
b. Regular Expression Pattern Matching  
Regular expression (shortened to “regex”) pattern matching is used to detect 
patterns in data. It provides more efficiency and flexibility over exact pattern matching by 
allowing the use of logical operators like “or” and “and” to specify specific context to 
match [19]. Regular expression is the pattern matching of choice employed in open 
source NIDS such as Snort1 and Bro.2 In preventing data exfiltration, organizations 
employ this kind of technique by first defining patterns to look for in outgoing network 
traffic. For instance, the pattern for a social security number can be defined like this: xxx-
xx-xxxx (x represents decimal number between 0 and 9). An NIDS based on regular 
expression pattern matching is employed at the network perimeter to look for those 
sensitive files that contain defined patterns and either block them from leaving the 
network or record them in the log [19].  
                                                 
1 See http://manual.snort.org/  
2 See https://www.bro.org/documentation/index.html  
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2. Keyword Matching 
Keyword matching involves developing some important words and putting them 
into a database that can be searched. These important words can be collected from 
sensitive files that need to be protected. The IDS can then be configured to look for files 
with those words in network traffic and either block any files with those words or log 
them. One of the problems with this is that some files that are not deemed sensitive may 
contain sensitive words and this can lead to high false positive rate. Also the amount of 
effort used to make up these words can be very high. Additionally, a malicious insider 
who is aware of the presence of a keyword matching system can defeat it by substituting 
characters in the file.    
3. Cryptographic Hash 
Cryptographic hash functions are used to prove that data has not been modified 
from its original version using the data’s digital signature (digest). A cryptographic hash 
function will take data of arbitrary size as input and produce a fixed size digest as output. 
These digests can then be used to detect an unauthorized modification of data by 
comparing the digest of the original hash to the new hash. One of the important 
characteristics of cryptographic hash functions is that they are one-way functions, 
meaning the digest they generate is irreversible: one cannot determine the original data 
from the hash. There are many hash functions in use today, but the most widely used are 
Message Digest 5 (MD5) and Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA), which is a Federal 
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) approved cryptographic hash for Federal 
agencies [20]. 
A cryptographic hash is good for proving that two files are identical, but it is not 
suitable for detecting similarities between files. The problem with cryptographic hashing 
in terms of using it for data exfiltration prevention is its “avalanche effect.” The 
avalanche effect describes a situation whereby a single bit flipped in an input to the hash 
function will result in a totally different output digest. As seen in Figure 3, two totally 
different digests were generated due to the fact that first input used a lower case “a” and 
the second input used an upper case “A.” Because of this, an NIDS based on 
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cryptographic hashes, employed by organizations to look for sensitive files transmitted 
across the network, can be deceived by a malicious insider who changes the characters in 
the sensitive files before exfiltration, knowing that the NIDS will not be able to match the 
hash of known data to the modified hash. Therefore, we need a solution that will be 
resilient to simple character modification.   To improve the resilience of data exfiltration 




Figure 3.  Example of SHA-1 Hash Function, from [21] 
C. APPROXIMATE MATCHING 
Approximate matching is a generic term describing any technique designed to 
identify similarities between two digital artifacts such as files or images [22]. It can be 
employed to correlate complex and unstructured data that have certain amount of byte-
level similarities. It does not rely on exact matching; it relies on finding similarities 
between two given files by comparing their 1s and 0s (byte level). Its applications include 
data filtering, security monitoring, digital forensics, malware detection, document 
versioning, etc.  
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Various research has been done on the uses of approximate matching, including 
Gupta’s analysis of sdhash to detect files in network traffic [23]. Gupta’s work examined 
both sdhash and mrsh-v2 approximate matching algorithms in detecting presence of 
known files (sensitive file) in network traffic. He argued that even though both can be 
used to detect the presence of known files in network traffic, mrsh-v2 has better 
processing time.  
Kornblum’s context triggered piecewise hashing (CTPH) [24] involves breaking 
up a file into pieces (chunks), generating a 6-bit hash for each chunk using a rolling hash 
and then concatenating the hashes in order to produce the file digest. His idea is to 
combine a context triggered rolling hash and a traditional hashing algorithm to identify 
known files that have been modified or deleted.   
Additional research that had been done on the usage of approximate matching is 
the work of Vassil Roussev in Data Fingerprinting with Similarity Digests [25]. 
Roussev’s idea is to identify statistically-improbable features (features that are unique to 
data object such as file) and use them to generate similarity digest as opposed to 
randomized feature selection pioneered by Rabin in 1981. He argued that the use of 
similarity digest allows queries to be answered approximately, thereby providing a 
measure of correlation as opposed to cryptographic hashes that only support yes or no 
answers to digest queries. Another previous work on approximate matching is the work 
of Vassil Roussev and Candice Quates in Content Triage with Similarity Digests: The 
M57 case study [26]. Their work involved using sdhash to identify traces of data objects 
such as files, disk blocks, and network packets inside a bigger object of arbitrary size, 
such as disk image or network capture.  
However, not much research has been done on the implementation of approximate 
matching on GPUs. Depending on the size of an organization, billions of packets can 
traverse a network in a given day. Most intrusion detection/prevention system employed 
on the network perimeter for filtering purposes have a hard time keeping up with the 
amount of network traffic because of the computationally intensive nature of comparing 
and matching signatures, strings, and hashes. Because of the special processing power of  
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GPUs (more memory bandwidth and more transistors for calculation), they can be 
employed on security devices to speed up hash lookup as well as string and signature 
comparison.  
1. Byte-Wise Approximate Matching Algorithms 
Three of the prominent algorithms in the field of byte-level approximate matching 
are ssdeep, mrsh-v2, and sdhash. Each has its advantages and disadvantages. The focus of 
this research is on sdhash, an approximate matching algorithm developed by Vassil 
Roussev and Candice Quates. A brief description of ssdeep, mrsh-v2, and sdhash is 
provided below. 
a. Ssdeep 
ssdeep was developed by Jesse Kornblum in 2006 [24]. It is used for producing 
context triggered piecewise hashes (CTPH), also called fuzzy hashes. His main 
contribution is to combine a context triggered rolling hash and a traditional hashing 
algorithm to identify known files that have been modified or deleted. His idea was, rather 
than generating a single hash for the entire file, a hash can be generated for many discrete 
fixed-size segments (chunks) of the file. For example, one hash is generated for the first 
512 bytes of input, another hash for the next 512 bytes, and so on.  
Hashes of each chunk are generated using a rolling hash. The resulting hashes are 
then concatenated to produce a similarity digest. In order to know where to start and stop 
traditional hashing of the chunks, this algorithm uses the rolling hash to identify a trigger 
point. A trigger point, which occurs at the end of a chunk is identified using a window 
size of 7 bytes that moves through the whole input. After a trigger point is identified, a 
traditional hash is carried out. The traditional hashing (non-cryptographic hash) was 
based on Fowler/Noll/Vo (FNV) hash.  
b. Mrsh-v2 
Multi-resolution similarity hashing version 2 (mrsh-v2) is an updated version of 
MRSH. It was proposed by Frank Breitinger and Harald Baier [27]. It borrowed design  
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elements from both ssdeep and sdhash. Its approach is to break up an input, i.e., file, into 
fragments (chunks) and hash each chunk using a rolling hash. The resulting hashes are 
put into Bloom filters in order to save space and increase comparison efficiency. Mrsh-v2 
operates in two modes: regular mode and f-mode. Regular mode is used to identify 
similar files, while f-mode is used for detecting file fragmentation [28]. 
c. Sdhash 
Sdhash stands for similarity digest hash and it was developed by Vassil Roussev 
in 2010 [26]. It is an algorithm that allows two arbitrary blobs of data to be compared for 
similarity based on common strings of binary data [29]. Sdhash’s approach is to identify 
statistically-improbable features—features that are least likely to occur in other data 
objects by chance and use them to generate similarity digests. Each of the features is 
hashed using the cryptographic hash function SHA-1 and the resulting hashes are put into 
a series of Bloom filters, which are a space-efficient set representation. In order to carry 
out comparison between two digital artifacts, their digests can be compared. Sdhash 
applications include identification of embedded objects, identification of code versions, 
identification of related documents, and correlation of network fragments.  
Sdhash works in two modes namely continuous mode and block mode. 
Continuous mode is used to generate signatures for inputs less than 16MiB, which means 
the algorithm will continue adding unique features from the input to a Bloom filter until it 
reaches a saturation point set at 160 elements, at which point a new Bloom filter is 
created. Block mode is used for inputs greater than 16MiB. In this mode, the input is split 
into fixed-size blocks, which by default is set to 16KiB, and each block gets assigned to a 
separate Bloom filter. This default block value can be changed using the --block-size (-b) 
option in the algorithm. Features are selected from each block and added to that block’s 
Bloom filter until either all the features are added or the filter reaches a saturation point 




(1) Digest generation 
Sdhash digests can be generated using a single file or multiple files. The digest of 
a single file can be generated by typing sdhash then the file name. For example, sdhash 
myfile.doc. The --target-list (-f) option, which will generate sdbf file (digests) from a list 
of filenames, is convenient for generating digests for multiple files. Sdbf stands for 
similarity digest bloom filter. It is a bit vector used for space efficient set representation. -
-deep (-r) option can also be used if the files are contained in directories. The minimum 
file size that can be use as input to sdhash is 512 bytes. Any input files less than 512 
bytes will be silently skipped unless --verbose (-v) is specified as an option. Unless the --
output (-o) option is used to direct digest output to the files specified, sdhash will print 
the digest to the standard output (screen). Each line of the digest consists of several 
header fields separated by semicolons, followed by base64-encoding of the digest data 
[29]. See sample output in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Sample sdhash digest standard output. 









sdbf	 Sdbf’s magic string 
03	 Sdbf version number 
10	 Number of characters in input name 
000003.do
c	
The input name 
48128	 Input size in bytes 
Sha1	 Hash algorithm used 
256	 Size of Bloom filter in bytes 
5	 Number of independent hash functions 
7ff	 Mask value for determining which bits of the 5 sub-hashes generated by 
splitting the SHA1 hash should be used to map a feature to the 256-byte 
filter 
160	 Maximum number of feature element allowed in a Bloom filter (160 for 
continuous mode and 192 for block mode) 
5	 Number of Bloom filters 
25	 Number of features in the last Bloom filter 
Table 3.   Sdhash digest header breakdown. 
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In Chapter II, I described some previous work that had been performed in the 
domain of approximate matching and explained three of the prominent approximate 
matching algorithms. In this chapter, I detail the steps involved in performing my 
experiment. The goal is to compare reference sets, which represent sensitive files to be 
protected and target sets, which represent files captured over the network. These 
comparisons will be performed using CPU and GPU implementations of sdhash while 
measuring the time. To do this, I used the following six steps:  
1. Request CPU and GPU nodes from an HPC cluster 
2. Download and compile sdhash code on the given node 
3. Download data files (GovDocs) 
4. Generate digests for both reference and target sets using sdhash 
5. Use the CPU implementation of sdhash to compare the reference set to the 
target set. 
6. Use the GPU implementation of sdhash to compare the reference set to the 
target set. 
A. REQUESTING A CPU AND A GPU NODE FROM THE HPC CLUSTER 
To carry out this experiment, the first thing I did was request a CPU node and a 
GPU node from the NPS “Hamming” High Performance Computing (HPC) cluster. 
Hamming is a supercomputer at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) designed for 
computationally intensive research for both students and faculty. It is named after a 
renowned mathematician Richard Hamming, who was a Professor of Computer Science 
at NPS from 1976 to 1998. Hamming contains over 2,000 computing cores. It has been 
used in student theses involving weather forecasting, polar ice prediction, modelling of 
helicopter rotors, data mining (extracting important data from very large datasets), and 
solving complicated mathematical equations.  
To request a node, a qsub3 job has to be submitted to the cluster. In the qsub job, 
one has to specify resources needed to complete the job. These resources include the 
                                                 
3 See http://docs.adaptivecomputing.com/torque/4-0-2/Content/topics/commands/qsub.htm.  
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number of processors, amount of memory, amount of time, etc. For example, I submitted 
two qsub jobs, one requesting the CPU node with 64 cores and 2GB of memory per core 
(128GB) and the other requesting the GPU node with 8 GPUs. An example of each of the 
qsub jobs is given below. 
qsub -I –l nodes=1:ppn=64,pmem=2gb,walltime=24:00:00,naccesspolicy=singleuser,hostlist=compute-7-
27   
qsub -I –l nodes=1:gpus=8,walltime=24:00:00,naccesspolicy=singleuser,hostlist=compute-8-17  
Each option in the qsub job is explained below  
 I option – requests the job to be run interactively. 
 l option – specifies the resources required for the job 
 ppn option – specifies number of processors per node. For the above job, a 
CPU node with 64 cores was requested.  
 walltime option –  specifies how long the job is going to be running on the 
given node. It specifies in hh:mm:ss format. The above jobs requested 24 
hours 
 naccesspolicy option –  reserves the node for the requester alone. It allows 
no other user’s job to be running on the given node. This is useful for 
measuring timing information. 
 gpus option –  is used to request GPUs. A node with 8 GPUs was 
requested for the job shown above.  
 pmem option – specifies the memory per processor in GB. A CPU node 
with 128GB of memory was requested for this experiment.  
 hostlist option – specifies  a particular node out of the HPC node 
inventory.  
The above jobs told the HPC cluster which specific resources I needed to do the                               
comparisons. The HPC looked up the nodes specified in the jobs to see if they were 
available. Theoretically, if they were, it would come back and give me the node. If they 
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were not, it would put the jobs in the queue until the resources were available to fulfil the 
jobs. In this case, the resources were available and the HPC gave me the nodes that I 
requested. The details of the nodes are explained below. 
 CPU Node  
This Hamming node, Compute-7-27, is running CentOS release 6.6 with Linux 
version 2.6.32-431.20.3.el6.x86_64 and GNU Compiler Collection (GCC) 4.4.7. It 
includes 64 cores AMD Opteron™ Processor 62744 running at 1400 MHz (1.4GHz), 
with 128GB of memory (See Appendix B). 
 GPU Node  
This Hamming node, Compute-8-27, is running CentOS release 6.6 with Linux 
version 2.6.32-431.20.3.el6.x86_64 and GCC compiler 4.4.7. It includes 8 GeForce GTX 
Black TITAN NVIDIA GPUs with 2880 CUDA5 cores running at 889MHz. It also 
includes an on-board 6GB of GDDR5 memory [31] (See Appendix C). 
Before I go further, it is important to point out some of the differences between a 
CPU and a GPU.  
 Central Processing Unit (CPU) 
A CPU is a general-purpose processor that is considered the brain of a computer. 
It has four primary functions: fetch, decode, execute, and writeback. CPUs are developed 
and optimized for sequential serial processing. They contain more control hardware for 
tasks such as allocating memory and therefore reduce space available on the chip for 
calculations. CPUs normally comprise only a few cores with lots of cache memory. 
 Graphic Processing Unit (GPU) 
GPUs were originally designed for rendering graphics, but have evolved to the 
point where many other real-world applications are being implemented on them. The 
development of Compute Unified Device Architecture (CUDA) parallel programming 
                                                 
4  See http://www.cpu-world.com/CPUs/Bulldozer/AMD-
Opteron%206274%20OS6274WKTGGGU.html. 
5  See http://www.nvidia.com/object/cuda_home_new.html. 
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language by NVIDIA has made it easy for programmers to write code that will harness 
the power of GPUs. Also the introduction of General-purpose Computing on Graphics 
Processing Units (GPGPU) has allowed computationally intensive research to be carried 
out using the GPU’s parallel processing power. Some of the benefits of GPUs over CPUs 
include more computing power, larger memory bandwidth, and less power consumption. 
B. DOWNLOADING AND COMPILING SDHASH CODE 
This experiment used sdhash-3.4. Even though, as at the time of this writing, 
sdhash-4.0 was released, it was designated as an experimental version; and therefore it 
was considered not stable enough to be used for this experiment. Sdhash-3.4 was 
downloaded from GitHub.6 Because of administrative restrictions on the HPC 
supercomputer, I could only compile the code in my home directory. For the code to 
work on the GPU node, the CUDA 6.5 toolkit, NVIDIA drivers, and GCC compiler 4.4.7 
were installed. For the CPU node, the GCC compiler was installed. After all the 
necessary libraries and dependencies were installed, I used the included Makefile in 
sdhash to compile the code.  
C. DOWNLOADING DATA FILES 
For this experiment, I used the GovDocs7 corpus, which is a collection of files 
with various file formats collected by crawling through U.S. Government websites and 
made freely available for research. The corpus was downloaded from 
http://digitalcorpora.org/ corpora/govdocs. It includes Word documents, Adobe pdfs, 
jpegs, html files, text files, PowerPoint files, gifs, Excel files, and so on. It is made up of 
1000 directories with approximately 986 files in each directory, making a total of 
986,278 files, totalling 468GB in size. The directories are numbered from 000 to 999. 
Files in each directory were named with a 3-digit directory number, a 3-digit file number, 
and the extension. For example, the 30th file in the 2nd directory, which happened to be a 
                                                 
6  Available at https://github.com/sdhash/sdhash. 
7  Available at http://digitalcorpora.org/corpora/govdocs. 
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Table 4.   Distribution of file types in the GovDocs corpus 
D. GENERATING DIGESTS 
The files in the GovDocs corpus were used to simulate both sensitive files to be 
protected and files captured over the network. For the purpose of comparison, I created 
two sets of similarity digests. The first is the reference set, which contains sdhash digests 
of simulated sensitive files. The second is the target set, which contains sdhash digests of 
simulated files captured over the network.  
1. Reference Set  
Because I want to do the comparison of reference sets and target sets in 
incremental order, I created five reference sets of varying sizes. To do this, I created five 
directories and named them as reference_250, reference_500, reference_750, 
reference_1000, and reference_2000. The number prepended to each named reference 
represents the number of files contained in that reference set. For example, reference_250 
contained 250 files; reference_500 contained 500 files, and so on. In order to add files to 
each of my reference set directories, I first combined all the files in each of the GovDocs 
corpus directories into a single directory called All_GovDocs. I accomplished this by first 
using the find command to locate any files in the GovDocs directories and then the cp 
command to copy them to All_GovDocs directory. Here is the exact command: 
find . –name *.* -exec cp –t ../All_GovDocs {} + 
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The command break down is: 
 find – searches directories recursively downward from my current location 
denoted by the dot (.). 
 -name – specifies the name of the file to find. In this command I used any 
files with any extension as denoted by *.* 
 -exec cp – this denotes the action to perform on the files being found by 
find command. In this case I want to copy them. 
 -t – this specifies the directory to copy the files to. I used  ../ to tell the cp 
command to go up one directory from my current directory and put the 
copied files in All_GovDocs directory. 
 {} – is a place holder that will be replaced by the files found. 
 + – this prevents overflow of argument that the cp command can handle 
After I combined all the files in the GovDocs directories into one directory, I 
copied the appropriate number of files to each of my reference sets. For example, I 
copied 250 files into my first reference set called reference_250 by doing the following: 
cp {000000..000249}.* ../reference_250 
Note: This command was executed from the All_GovDocs directory  
The cp command copied files starting from 000000 to 000249 from the 
All_GovDocs directory to reference_250 directory. The wildcard .* indicates that it 
doesn’t matter what the extension of the files are. ../ will go up one directory from my 
current working directory (All_GovDocs) and find reference_250 directory where the 
copied files will be placed. I repeated this process to copy files to the rest of my reference 
sets with the following commands: 
cp {000000..000499}.* ../reference_500 
cp {000000..000749}.* ../reference_750 
cp {000000..000999}.* ../reference_1000 
cp {000000..001999}.* ../reference_2000 
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After I added files to my five reference sets, I generated similarity digests for each 
by running sdhash against each reference directory in order to produce a Similarity 
Digest Bloom Filter (sdbf) file. For example, to generate the sdbf file for reference_250, I 
ran the following sdhash command on the CPU node: 
sdhash -r reference_250 > reference_250.sdbf 
 -r instructs sdhash to generate an sdbf from the directory given (reference_250) 
 > redirects the output to a file called reference_250.sdbf 
Note: I did not measure time performance for generating similarity digests between the 
CPU and GPU because the GPU implementation of sdhash does not include the option to 
generate digests; it can only do comparison.  
Table 5 shows the name of my reference sets, the number of digests contained in 
each, the total size of the files in each reference before I ran them through sdhash and the 














Reference_250.sdbf	 250 222 4 
Reference_500.sdbf	 500 322 8.4 
Reference_750.sdbf	 750 477 13 
Reference_1000.sdbf	 1000 733 21 
Reference_2000.sdbf	 2000 1343 39 
Table 5.   Reference sets with number of digests per reference set, total file 
size before sdhash and total digest size after sdhash 
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2. Target Set 
Different networks will have different properties, so I cannot come up with a 
number that works for all of them. For this reason, I arbitrarily came up with the number 
of files to include in my target sets. I first chose 30,000 files from the GovDocs corpus to 
include in my first target set. The way I did this was similar to the way I created my 
reference sets. From creating my reference sets, I already had all files in each directory of 
the GovDocs corpus combined into one directory called All_GovDocs. Therefore, I 
copied the first 30,000 files from the All_GovDocs directory to a directory called 
target_30. To accomplish this, I used the following command from inside the 
All_GovDocs directory: 
cp {000000..029999}.* ../target_30 
The cp command copied files starting from 000000 to 029999 from the 
All_GovDocs directory to target_30 directory. The wildcard .* was used to ignore the 
extention of the files.  ../ indicated to go up one directory from my current working 
directory (All_GovDocs) and find target_30 directory where the copied files will be 
placed. I repeated this process to copy files to the rest of my target sets with the following 
commands: 
cp {000000..029999}.* ../target_30 
cp {000000..035999}.* ../target_36 
cp {000000..182999}.* ../target_183 
cp {000000..199999}.* ../target_200 
It is important to know that all these target sets are essentially subset of one 
another because the copied files still remained in the All_GovDocs directory. This means 
the files contained in the target_30 are also part of target_36 and so on. 
After I added files to my five target sets, I generated similarity digests for each by 
running sdhash against each target directory in order to produce a Similarity Digest 
Bloom Filter (sdbf) file. For example, to generate the sdbf file for my first target set 
called target_30, I ran the following sdhash command on the CPU node: 
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sdhash -r target_30 > target_30.sdbf 
Table 6 shows the name of target sets, the number of digests in each, the size of 











Target_30.sdbf	 30,000 16 496 
Traget_36.sdbf	 36,000 19 607 
Traget_65.sdbf	 65,000 34 1100 
Target_183.sdbf	 183,890 100 2400 
Target_392.sdbf	 392,078 200 5100 
Table 6.   Table showing name of target sets, number of digests per target set, 
total file size before sdhash and total size of digests after sdhash  
E. COMPARING REFERENCE SET AND TARGET SET USING THE CPU 
IMPLEMENTATION OF SDHASH 
After I finished generating sdhash digests for both the reference sets and the 
target sets, I compared them using the CPU implementation of sdhash algorithm. The 
comparisons were conducted between each of the five reference sets and each of the five 
target sets using CPU. To do this, I compared each of my five reference sets and the first 
target set (target_30.sdbf) five times in order to measure the time accurately (what I mean 
by measuring the time accurately is that I don’t want too much disparity between each 
time measurement). For example, I did comparisons between reference_250.sdbf and 
target_30.sdbf, between reference_500.sdbf and target_30.sdbf, between 
reference_750.sdbf and target_30.sdbf, between reference_1000.sdbf and target_30.sdbf, 
and between reference_2000.sdbf and target_30.sdbf. Each comparison was performed 
five times and the time measurement was recorded for each. An example of the command 
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used to do the comparison between the reference sets and the target sets using the CPU 
implementation of sdhash is as follows:. 
date  >> time.txt; sdhash  -c  -p 64  reference_250.sdbf  target_30.sdbf   >  250_30_cpu.txt; date  
>> time.txt 
The command break down is: 
 date command - grabs the date and time and appends it to time.txt 
file.(start time) 
 -c - runs sdhash in comparison mode. 
 -p 64 - informs sdhash to use all available 64 cores in the node. (if this is 
not specified, sdhash automatically uses all available cores anyway) 
 reference_250.sdbf  - is the reference set that is being queried in target 
set. 
 target_30.sdbf  - is the target set being queried. 
 250_30_cpu.txt - redirects the output to a text file called 250_30_cpu.txt. 
 date command - outputs the date and time to time.txt file. (end time) 
 The time it took to complete the CPU comparison was calculated by subtracting 
the start time from the end time. For instance, the CPU comparison of reference_250.sdbf 
and target_30.sdbf had a start time of 22:06:47 (hour:minute:seconds) and an end time of 
22:08:44 (hour:minute:seconds). So to calculate the time it took to complete this 
comparison, I subtracted 22:06:47 from 22:08:44, which equals 117 seconds (1 minute 
and 57 seconds).  
The computing resources used for all CPU comparisons was explained in A(1) of 
this chapter and the detailed results of each comparison are explained in the Results 
section of this paper. 
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F. COMPARING REFERENCE SET AND TARGET SET USING THE GPU 
IMPLEMENTATION OF SDHASH 
After comparing each of the five reference sets and each of the five target sets 
using the CPU implementation of sdhash, I carried out the same comparison using the 
GPU implementation of sdhash. This is essentially doing the same thing but instead of 
using the CPU to compare, I used the GPU. Using the GPU node, I conducted 
comparisons between each of the five reference sets and each of the five target sets. For 
instance, I compared reference_250.sdbf and target_30.sdbf, reference_500.sdbf and 
target_30.sdbf, reference_750.sdbf and target_30.sdbf, reference_1000.sdbf and 
target_30.sdbf and reference_2000.sdbf and target_30.sdbf. Each comparison was run 
five times and the time was recorded for each set of comparisons. I repeated the same 
process for target_36.sdbf, target_65.sdbf, target_183.sdbf, and target_392.sdbf. An 
example of command to run sdhash comparison in GPU is as follows: 
date >> time.txt; sdhash-gpu  -r  reference_250.sdbf  -t  target_30.sdbf >  250_30_gpu.txt; date  
>> time.txt 
The command break down is: 
 date command – grabs the date and time and append it to time.txt file. (start time) 
 -r – specifies the reference set (reference_250.sdbf) 
 -t – specifies the target set (target_30.sdbf) 
 250_30_gpu.txt – redirects the output of the comparison to a text file called 
250_30_gpu.txt. 
 date command – outputs the date and time to time.txt file (end time) 
To calculate comparison time in GPU, I subtracted the start time from the end 
time. For example, one of the five comparisons between reference_250.sdbf and 
target_30.sdbf had a start time of 08:37:53 (hour:minute:seconds) and an end time of 
08:39:26 (hour:minute:seconds). So to calculate comparison time, I subtracted 08:37:53 
from 08:39:26, which equals 93 seconds (1 minute and 33 seconds).    
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The computing resources used for all GPU comparisons were explained in A(2) of 




Having generated digests of the reference sets and the target sets and compared 
them using the CPU and GPU implementation of sdhash in Chapter III, I will use this 
chapter to explain my results from the comparisons. For brevity, I put the results of each 
comparison in tables and charts. As I mentioned in the Methodology section, each of the 
five reference sets is compared to each of the five target sets five times, while taking time 
measurements of each run. To this end, I prepared five tables and five charts that show 
the results.  
Included in each table are seven columns. The first column is the name of the 
reference sets. The second column is the name of the target sets. The third column is used 
to record CPU times from each of the five runs, measured in seconds. The fourth column 
is the average CPU time derived by adding each CPU time from each run and dividing 
the total by 5. For example, the average CPU time of comparing reference_250.sdbf and 
target_30.sdbf was calculated by adding 117, 119, 117, 118, and 116 and dividing the 
total by 5, which equals 117.4, and rounding down to 117 seconds. The fifth column is 
used to record GPU times from each of the five runs measured in seconds. The sixth 
column is the average GPU time derived by adding each GPU time from each run and 
dividing the total by 5. For example, the average GPU time of comparing 
reference_250.sdbf and target_30.sdbf was calculated by adding 91, 89, 91, 91 and 91 
and dividing the total by 5, which equals 90.6 seconds, and rounding up to 91 seconds.  
The seventh column is the speedup between CPU time and GPU time. To 
calculate this speedup, I divided the average CPU time by the average GPU time. For 
example, to calculate the speedup between the CPU comparison time and the GPU 
comparison time of reference_250.sdbf and target_30.sdbf, I divided the average CPU 
time 117 by the average GPU time 91, which equals 1.29. What this means is that GPU is 
1.29x times faster than CPU when comparing reference_250.sdbf and target_30.sdbf. 





Table 7.   Comparison of varying sizes of reference sets and the16GB target set 
The biggest time difference between the CPU and the GPU for this comparison 
was attained when I compared reference_2000.sdbf and target_30.sdbf. It took the CPU 
implementation 15 minutes and 19 seconds to compare the set, while the GPU 
implementation took only 5 minutes and 16 seconds. This was a time difference of 10 
minutes and 3 seconds. 
Based on the result of the speedup (Avg. CPU Time divided by Avg. GPU Time) 
in Table 7, it is noted that GPU performs 1.29x, 1.65x, 1.70x, 2.25x, and 2.91x times 
faster than CPU when comparing reference_250.sdbf, reference_500.sdbf, 
reference_750.sdbf, reference_1000.sdbf, and reference_2000.sdbf to target_30.sdbf 
respectively. What this means is that as the reference sets digest size increase, I gained 
better GPU performance. Figure 5 illustrates the time differences between the CPU and 




Figure 5.  Differences in time required to compare varying sizes of reference 
sets and the16GB target set 
The second comparison was carried out between each of the five reference sets 
and target_36.sdbf. As a reminder, target_36.sdbf contained 36,000 digests (607MB) and 
resulted from inputting 36,000 files (19GB) into sdhash. The biggest time difference 
between the CPU and GPU for this comparison was attained when I compared 
reference_2000.sdbf and target_36.sdbf. It took the CPU implementation 18 minutes and 
49 seconds to compare the set, while GPU implementation took only 6 minutes and 24 
seconds. This was a time difference of 12 minutes and 25 seconds. The results of these 
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Table 8.   Comparison of varying sizes of reference sets and the 19GB target 
set 
Figure 6 illustrates the time differences between comparison of reference sets and 
19GB target set on both CPU and GPU 
 
 
Figure 6.  Differences in time required to compare varying sizes of reference 
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The third comparison was done between each of the five reference sets and 
target_65.sdbf. As a reminder, target_65.sdbf contained 65,000 digests (1.1GB), which 
resulted from inputting 65,000 files (34GB) into sdhash. The biggest time difference 
between the CPU and GPU for this comparison was achieved when I compared 
reference_2000.sdbf and target_65.sdbf. It took CPU implementation 30 minutes and 35 
seconds to compare the set, while GPU implementation took 11 minutes and 15 seconds. 
This was a time difference of 19 minutes and 24 seconds. Table 9 shows the results.  
 
 





Figure 7.  Differences in time required to compare varying sizes of reference 
sets and the 34GB target set 
The fourth comparison was performed between each of the five reference sets and 
target_183.sdbf. As a reminder, target_183.sdbf contained 183,890 digests (2.4GB) and 
resulted from inputting 183,890 files (100GB) into sdhash. The biggest time difference 
between the CPU and GPU for this comparison was attained when I compared 
reference_2000.sdbf and target_183.sdbf. It took CPU implementation 73 minutes and 45 
seconds to compare the set, while GPU implementation took only 29 minutes 21 seconds. 
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Table 10.   Comparison of varying sizes of reference sets and the 100GB target 
set 
 
Figure 8.  Differences in time required to compare varying sizes of reference 
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The last comparison was performed between each of the five reference sets and 
target_392.sdbf. As a reminder, target_392.sdbf contained 392,078 digests (5.1GB) and 
resulted from inputting 392,078 files (200GB) into sdhash algorithm. The biggest time 
difference between CPU and GPU was attained for this comparison when I compared 
reference_2000.sdbf and target_392.sdbf. It took CPU implementation 170 minutes and 
12 seconds to compare the set, while GPU implementation took only 61 minutes and 58 
seconds. This was a time difference of 108 minutes and 14seconds (1 hour 48 minutes 
and 14 seconds). Table 11 displays the results. 
 
 





Figure 9.  Differences in time required to compare varying sizes of reference 
sets and the 200GB target set 
After all the comparisons, it became clear that the bigger the data sets to compare, 
the better the GPU performance. This was evidenced when I compared my biggest 
reference set, which was 2000 digests (1.3GB) and my biggest target set, which was 
392,078 digests (200GB). In this particular comparison, it took CPU implementation 2 
hours and 50 minutes to compare reference_2000.sdbf and target_392.sdbf; meanwhile, 
doing the same comparison in the GPU only took 1 hour and 2 minutes.  
With small data sets, there were no significant time differences between CPU and 
GPU comparison. As seen on all the comparison tables and charts. 
Even though the comparison time got better as I increased my data sets, I did not 
see a significant increase in the speedup. I wanted to keep increasing the reference set 
size to see if there will be a significant change in speedup, but the way the algorithm was 
written, I could not. I can only increase the target set size. As seen in Table 12 and Figure 
10, the highest speedup was achieved when comparing the 1.3GB (2000 digest files) 
























	 16GB 19.3GB 34GB 100GB 200GB 
Ref	=	222MB	 1.29 1.34 1.18 1.29 1.17 
Ref	=	322MB	 1.65 1.69 1.23 1.48 1.50 
Ref=	477MB	 1.70 1.72 1.41 1.57 1.62 
Ref	=	733MB	 2.25 2.45 2.44 2.30 2.31 
Ref	=	1343MB	 2.91 2.94 2.72 2.51 2.74 
Table 12.   Speedup between CPU and GPU 
 
 




Sdhash is an approximate matching algorithm. This capstone examined the 
potential to use sdhash to look for active transfer of sensitive files over the network. 
Because of the computationally intensive nature of comparing digests, it has not been 
implemented as a way to protect sensitive data on networks. To this end, I demonstrated 
speed performance of sdhash on both the CPU and GPU. The results of this experiment 
showed that better performance is achieved with the GPU when comparing large data 
sets, which means GPU will perform well when large amounts of data are involved. The 
experiment also showed that there were no significant differences in time when 
comparing small digests in the CPU and GPU, which means if the amount of data to be 
compared is minimal, there is no need to incur extra expenses to implement the GPU.  
The main contribution of this experiment is establishing feasibility of sdhash 
approximate matching in detecting data exfiltration over the network and determining 
which sdhash implementation is suitable for large networks such as DOD. 
Based on the result of this experiment, I concluded that the CPU implementation 
of sdhash will be more suitable in a small- to medium-network environment or more 
suitable in an environment where sensitive data are less common; meanwhile the GPU 
implementation of sdhash will be more suitable for high network environment such as the 
DOD, where thousands of files may traverse the network in any given day. The GPU 
implementation of sdhash will also be suitable in an organization that deals with and 
processes a high volume of sensitive data.  
The use of sdhash to compare sensitive files and files captured over the network is 
not going to be in real-time. It is meant more for batch processing, offline, of large 
amounts of data, as demonstrated in this experiment. The idea is to capture files 
traversing the network, maybe for a day, and then run sdhash algorithm against captured 
files offline to generate similarity digests that will be compared to similarity digests of 
sensitive files in order to determine if there were traces of sensitive file that left the 
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network. In other words, it is more comparable to an intrusion detection mechanism 
rather than to an intrusion prevention mechanism. 
For this experiment, I used the GovDocs corpus to simulate both sensitive files 
and files captured over the network; therefore for my future work, I will demonstrate this 
experiment on real network captures and real modified sensitive files that will be 
transferred and interleaved with regular network traffic. This will allow me the 
opportunity to measure both false positive and false negative rates of sdhash. I will also 
delve into how sdhash can be incorporated into GPU-based NIDS. 
Even though sdhash can be a very useful tool in detecting exfiltration of sensitive 
file, it not going to completely stop exfiltration and leakage. There are still some ways 
any determined malicious insider can trick it if they were aware of its presence on the 
networks. Malicious insiders can encrypt the sensitive file before exfiltration, they can 
zip the file or embed it in another file (steganography).   
Even though sdhash has some limitations, it still presents a better alternative to 
exact file matching, which can be easily tricked with character substitution and deletion. 
It is also a better alternative to cryptographic hashes, which will not detect exfiltration if a 
malicious insider changed a byte in sensitive file before exfiltration, owing to its 
“avalanche effect” property. 
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APPENDIX A. GLOSSARY 
Selected terms used in this paper are defined below. 
 
Algorithm: Any well-defined computational procedure that takes some values as input 
and produce some value or set of values as output. 
Data-at-rest: is defined as data stored in a persistence storage such as disk and tape 
Data-in-motion: is defined as data being transferred between two nodes. Also called 
data-in-transit 
Device Control Module (DCM): It provides the ability to restrict system access to 
peripheral devices such as thumb drives and other removable storage. 
ePolicy Orchestrator (ePO): A management server responsible for collecting events, 
controlling policies, and maintaining updated content for end-point product modules on 
all HBSS clients.  
Event: Any observable occurrence in a network or system. 
False Negative: An alert that fails to indicate malicious activity is occurring. 
False Positive: An alert that incorrectly indicates that malicious activity is occurring. 
Incident: A violation of computer security policies, acceptable use policies, or standard 
security policy. 
Host Intrusion Prevention System (HIPS): Software that automates the process of 
monitoring the events occurring in a computer system. 
McAfee Agent (MA): The software agent on a host system that provides local 
management of all HBSS products installed on the host. The MA is utilized by ePolicy 
Orchestrator to coordinate communication of events, enforcement of policies, product 
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APPENDIX B. CPU INFORMATION 
Architecture:          x86_64 
CPU op-mode(s):        32-bit, 64-bit 
Byte Order:            Little Endian 
CPU(s):                64 
On-line CPU(s) list:   0-63 
Thread(s) per core:    2 
Core(s) per socket:    8 
Socket(s):             4 
NUMA node(s):          8 
Vendor ID:             AuthenticAMD 
CPU family:            21 
Model:                 1 
Stepping:              2 
CPU MHz:               1400.000 
BogoMIPS:              4399.40 
Virtualization:        AMD-V 
L1d cache:             16K 
L1i cache:             64K 
L2 cache:              2048K 
L3 cache:              6144K 
NUMA node0 CPU(s):     0-7 
NUMA node1 CPU(s):     8-15 
NUMA node2 CPU(s):     16-23 
NUMA node3 CPU(s):     24-31 
NUMA node4 CPU(s):     32-39 
NUMA node5 CPU(s):     40-47 
NUMA node6 CPU(s):     48-55 
NUMA node7 CPU(s):     56-63 
 
==================== 
processor : 0 
vendor_id : AuthenticAMD 
cpu family : 21 
model  : 1 
model name : AMD Opteron(TM) Processor 6274                  
stepping : 2 
cpu MHz  : 1400.000 
cache size : 2048 KB 
physical id : 0 
siblings : 16 
core id  : 0 
cpu cores : 8 
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apicid  : 32 
initial apicid : 0 
fpu  : yes 
fpu_exception : yes 
cpuid level : 13 
wp  : yes 
flags  : fpu vme de pse tsc msr pae mce cx8 apic sep mtrr pge mca cmov pat 
pse36 clflush mmx fxsr sse sse2 ht syscall nx mmxext fxsr_opt pdpe1gb rdtscp lm 
constant_tsc rep_good nonstop_tsc extd_apicid amd_dcm aperfmperf pni pclmulqdq 
monitor ssse3 cx16 sse4_1 sse4_2 popcnt aes xsave avx lahf_lm cmp_legacy svm extapic 
cr8_legacy abm sse4a misalignsse 3dnowprefetch osvw ibs xop skinit wdt lwp fma4 
nodeid_msr topoext perfctr_core cpb npt lbrv svm_lock nrip_save tsc_scale vmcb_clean 
flushbyasid decodeassists pausefilter pfthreshold 
bogomips : 4400.03 
TLB size : 1536 4K pages 
clflush size : 64 
cache_alignment : 64 
address sizes : 48 bits physical, 48 bits virtual 




























APPENDIX C. GPU INFORMATION 
compute-8-17 
     state = free 
     np = 16 
     properties = intel 
     ntype = cluster 




431.20.3.el6.x86_64 #1 SMP Thu Jun 19 21:14:45 UTC 2014 x86_64,opsys=linux 
     mom_service_port = 15002 
     mom_manager_port = 15003 
     gpus = 8 
     gpu_status =  





gpu[6] = gpu_id=0000:89:00.0;gpu_product_name=GeForce GTX TITAN 
Black;gpu_display=N/A;gpu_pci_device_id=100C10DE;gpu_pci_location_id=0000:89:0
0.0;gpu_fan_speed=26%;gpu_mode=Exclusive_Thread;gpu_state=Unallocated;gpu_utili
zation=N/A;gpu_memory_utilization=N/A;gpu_ecc_mode=N/A; gpu_temperature=28 C. 
 






























C,driver_ver=340.29,timestamp=Sat Feb 21 14:28:16 2015 
 
+------------------------------------------------------+                        
| NVIDIA-SMI 340.29     Driver Version: 340.29         |                        
|-------------------------------+----------------------+----------------------+ 
| GPU  Name        Persistence-M| Bus-Id        Disp.A | Volatile Uncorr. ECC | 
| Fan  Temp  Perf  Pwr:Usage/Cap|         Memory-Usage | GPU-Util  Compute M. | 
|===============================+======================+========
==============| 
|   0  GeForce GTX TIT...  Off  | 0000:04:00.0     N/A |                  N/A | 
| 26%   34C    P0    N/A /  N/A |     15MiB /  6143MiB |     N/A    E. Thread | 
+-------------------------------+----------------------+----------------------+ 
|   1  GeForce GTX TIT...  Off  | 0000:05:00.0     N/A |                  N/A | 
| 26%   30C    P0    N/A /  N/A |     15MiB /  6143MiB |     N/A    E. Thread | 
+-------------------------------+----------------------+----------------------+ 
|   2  GeForce GTX TIT...  Off  | 0000:08:00.0     N/A |                  N/A | 
| 26%   28C    P0    N/A /  N/A |     15MiB /  6143MiB |     N/A    E. Thread | 
+-------------------------------+----------------------+----------------------+ 
|   3  GeForce GTX TIT...  Off  | 0000:09:00.0     N/A |                  N/A | 
| 26%   30C    P0    N/A /  N/A |     15MiB /  6143MiB |     N/A    E. Thread | 
+-------------------------------+----------------------+----------------------+ 
|   4  GeForce GTX TIT...  Off  | 0000:85:00.0     N/A |                  N/A | 
| 26%   30C    P0    N/A /  N/A |     15MiB /  6143MiB |     N/A    E. Thread | 
+-------------------------------+----------------------+----------------------+ 
|   5  GeForce GTX TIT...  Off  | 0000:86:00.0     N/A |                  N/A | 
| 26%   30C    P0    N/A /  N/A |     15MiB /  6143MiB |     N/A    E. Thread | 
+-------------------------------+----------------------+----------------------+ 
|   6  GeForce GTX TIT...  Off  | 0000:89:00.0     N/A |                  N/A | 
| 26%   28C    P0    N/A /  N/A |     15MiB /  6143MiB |     N/A    E. Thread | 
+-------------------------------+----------------------+----------------------+ 
|   7  GeForce GTX TIT...  Off  | 0000:8A:00.0     N/A |                  N/A | 
| 26%   30C    P0    N/A /  N/A |     15MiB /  6143MiB |     N/A      Default | 
+-------------------------------+---------------------- 
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